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"Athletic competition builds character in
our boys. We do not need that kind of
character in our girls."
- a Superor Court judge in Connecticut, in the
case of Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic
Conference· 1971 -
Twelve year-old Denise Simpson is one
of the stars of the Upton Youth Club soccer
team. By 1983, Denise had been playing on
the team, which represents the towns of
Upton and Mendon in Worcester County,
for three years. There was only one
problem: in the spring season, Denise was
not permitted to play.
That was because spring soccer
competition in eastern and much of central
Massachusetts is dominated by the Boston
Area Youth Soccer League (BAYS), and,
until Denise and her parents brought BAYS
to court, the league required strict sex
segregation on all local teams that
participated in league competition. If a town
did not have a girls' team, as Upton and
Mendon did not, then a girl could either try
to find a nearby town that did have one and
might accept her, or she could sit the season
out.
Denise and her parents were not satisfied
with these alternatives. For one thing,
transportation to neighboring towns was a
problem. For another, Denise wanted to
play for the home team, as her brother and
her friends did. Finally, Denise was a
superior player who needed the challenge of
coed competition. The team's coach and
manager both wanted her to play.
The directors of BAYS firmly refused to
consider it. If the team dared to include a
girl, they said, it would forfeit all its league
games.
T'he Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts took Denise's case to court
and, in May 1983, won an injunction
requiring BAYS to let Denise play. In
October, prodded by the injunction, BAYS
revised its rules to permit coed teams to
compete in its "boys" division. BAYS
refused, however, to rename the division to
reflect the change. The board strongly felt
that boys and girls should be encouraged --
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even if they could not legally be required -- to
play on separate teams.
The BAYS case dramatized the paradox
of sex discrimination in athletics. Denise
faced a classic type of discrimination: if not
for her sex, she could have played on the
team. Even if there had been a girls' team at
her age level in town, it obviously would
have been discriminatory to refuse to let
Denise play on the boys' team if she could
qualify.
But girls' and women's sports have been
kept separate for so long that it is almost
unthinkable to most of us that segregation --
what are conveniently but mistakenly called
"separate but equal" teams -- should be
eliminated. This is, of course, because we
assume, with some justice, that men's and
women's athletic abilities are not equal.
Thus, the teams are kept separate precisely
because they are not equal. If integration
were required, so the conventional wisdom
runs, most women would be eliminated
from town, league, or school athletic
competition.
Most courts confronted with legal
questions involving sex discrimination in
athletics have accepted this logic and
assumed, often without much analysis, that
"separate but equal" is lawful. That is, as
long as opportunities, facilities, financial
support, and coaching are offered equally to
girls' and boys' athletic programs,
segregation is acceptable. BAYS took this
assumption an extra step: segregation was
not only acceptable, all other things being
equal -- it was necessary.
One problem with this approach is that
"all other things" rarely are equal. Separate
teams are created because girls are
presumed to have inferior athletic ability. It
is not really clear to what extent the ability
gap is culturally rather than biologically
determined. As the U.S. Supreme Court
has observed, it is "habit, rather than
analysis or reflection," that accounts for
most sex discrimination. It may be that
segregated teams operate as self-fulfilling
prophecies.
This is not to say that males, at least as
adults, are not on the average bigger and
stronger than females. It takes no
sociological treatise to demonstrate this
obvious fact. Size and strength give adult
males advantages in many sports. And if
competition for places on teams in these
sports at the high school level or above were
fully integrated, few females would qualify.
But this does not justify strict segregation
in all sports and at all age levels. Nor is it a
reason ever to bar the exceptional female
athlete of any age from trying out for the
best team on which she is able to compete. It
is probably feasible to have coed
competition in virtually all sports up to the
age of thirteen or fourteen.
Given training, encouragement, and true
equality at the younger ages, girls and
women may be better able to compete on an
integrated basis on many sports, even after
puberty. Tennis, skiing, golf, archery,
swimming, diving, gymnastics, volleyball,
track, even soccer, may tl,lrn out to be
amenable to coed competition. If equality
and integration are promoted to the extent
they are feasible, we all could be surprised at
the athletic abilities -- not to mention the
"character" -- that develops in our sisters
and daughters.
Marjorie Heins is a staff attorney at the Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts. She
represented the Simpson family in their lawsuit
against BAYS.
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